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No. 1

"THE DRED SCOTT CASE."
By HENRY S. BARKER, President State University.
It is our purpose in this article to examine the celebrated case
of Scott vs. Sanford (I9 Howard 393), commonly known as "The
Dred Scott case." We are impelled to this not only because of the
magnitude and interest of the principles involved at the time, but
because the case marks a forward step in that great discontent, which
is rkpidly growing up among meri, with the decisions of the courts in
what are called political cases.
The final result of this case shows the impotence of courts to
stay the onward march of a moral principle by a judicial mandate.
Never was a greater moral question presented for adjudication to a
court than was presented by the record in this case to the Supreme
Court of the United States. The real question was the right of
slavery to extend itself by process of law over all the territories of the
United States-the apparent question on the record was the right of
an humble negro to his freedom.
From the earliest moment in the history of the Union, the question of slavery was a serious menace to its permanancy. Originally
it existed in all the colonies and afterwards in most of the states, but
the trend of civilization was against it, and where the institution was
least profitable, the moral sentiment in favor of liberty grew proportionately. At the formation of the Constitution (1787), the right of
one man to own his fellowman was practically denied in all of the
northern states and the sentiment in favor of universal freedom was
strong among the most intellectual citizens of the South, chief among
whom were Thomas Jefferson and George Mason, of Virginia. In
1793, the invention of the saw gin by Eli Whitney, which enabled one
negro to clean more than a thousand pounds of cotton in a day, so
enhanced the value of slaves that the commercial interest of the
South was arrayed against freedom and in favor of negro slavery.
The result of all this was that the Union was divided into sectionsNorth and South-on the question of slavery. TJhe moral sentiment
in favor of freedom grew so rapidly in the North that it early became
apparent that the interest of slavery must be made to grow also or
the institution would soon be submerged beneath the waves of the
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great moral revolt rising against it. To this end the statesmen of
the South concentrated their attention on the acquisition of new
slave territory. Florida, Louisiana, Texas and California were
acquired, but nevertheless it was obvious that unless something was
done to still further extend slave territory, the dominance of the
South in the policy of the nation was doomed.
In 182o, when Missouri (a part of the Louisiana purchase) applied for admission as a slave state, Congress refused her petition
and the country was brought face to face with the long-delayed death
struggle between the forces of freedom and the forces of slavery xn
such alarming fashion that the hearts of those who loved the Union
almost sank in despair; Thomas Jefferson said the sudden apparition
startled him "like a fire bell in the night." After a somewhat prolonged political struggle a compromise was agreed upon and Missouri
was admitted as a slave state, with the proviso that in all other
territory north of the line 36° 3o' slavery should be prohibited.
In 1787, while the convention at Philadelphia was forming the
Constitution, the Congress of the expiring Confederation was adopting
an ordinance organizing the Northwest Territory, a vast boundary
of land north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi, now comprising
the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana and Ohio. By
section 6 of this ordinance slavery was prohibited in the territnry.
All the Northwest Territory was finally admitted into the Union as
states with slavery prohibited in their constitutions. California on
the extreme west was a free state and it really seemed that the tree
of slavery was at last girdled round and must, as its enemies hoped
and its friends feared, soon die.
In 1854, the pro-slavery members of Congress under the leadership of Stephen A. Douglass, passed a bill repealing the Missouri
Compromise. The first effect of the repeal of the measure seemed
highly satisfactory to the men of the South, but in the North it was
met with a roar of indignation, and in the succeeding congressional
elections the Democratic majority of eighty-four was entirely wiped
out and the party left in a minority of seventy-five.
It was not difficult to see that the opponents of slavery extension
by concert of action could immediately re-enact the Missouri Compromise, so far as the House was concerned, and that in a few years
they would doubtless control the Senate. If now, while the Supreme
Court was Democratic, a case could be brought before it which would
enable the judges, or a majority of them, to hold the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, then all would be well and slavery would
be established in the territories by judgment of the court. At this
juncture (1855) it was discovered that there was pending in a State
Court of Missouri a case which if properly prepared could go to the
Supreme Court of the United States, and which would present the
very question which the pro-slavery party desired to have adjudicated
-the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. The facts of
the case are as follows:
In 1834 Dr. Emerson, an army surgeon, had taken his slave,
Dred Scott, first to Illinois where slavery was prohibited by law,
then into that part of the territory of Wisconsin which is now the
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State of Minnesota and a part of the Louisiana purchase within the
prohibition of slavery by the Missouri Compromise. Subsequently
he returned with his slave to Missouri. Dr. Emerson afterwards died
leaving a will which appointed the testator's brother-in-law, John
F. A. Sanford, executor, and devising his property to his wife; Mrs.
Emerson afterwards married Dr. Calvin C. Chaffee, a member of
Congress from Massachusetts. Her brother John F. A. Sanford
resided in the State of New York.
Under the influence of local attorneys, Dred Scott had instituted
an ordinary ation in the State Court of Missouri against his mistress
claiming damages for a supposititious assault and battery and for
unlawfully depriving him of his liberty. Upon the issue formed in
this case the trial court held that the effect of taking the plaintiff
into a territory where slavery was prohibited by law was to make him
a free man and so his status remained after his return to Missouri,
and judgment was entered accordingly; this judgment on appeal was
reversed by the Court of last resort of Missouri and the case remanded
for further proceedings consistent with the judgment on appeal;
while it was in this condition, the attention of men high in authority
was directed to it and it was recognized as being the needed case for
the political exigency of the occasion. The original attorneys were
relegated to the rear and Scott's interests were placed in the hands
of very distinguished Counsel, Montgomery Blair and George
Ticknor Curtis, while Sanford's were entrusted to Senator Henry S.
Geyer, the leader of the St. Louis bar, and Reverdy Johnson, whose
reputation as a lawyer was coextensive with the whole country. The
case in the State Court was abandoned or, at least, ignored and a new
action instituted in the United States Circuit Court for the district
of Missouri, where a judgment adverse to the plaintiff was rendered
and an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was at
once prayed.
We are not stating the facts of this celebrated case with minute
particularity nor with absolute verbal accuracy but only in such
outline as will illustrate and explain the opinion of the Court.
The record on appeal presented several questions, some of them
more or less technical. These we shall not notice but limit our
examination to those in which the public at large were interested.
The first of the public questions presented was whether the plaintiff
was a citizen of the State of Missouri within the meaning of the
Constitution, which gives citizens of different States the right to sue
in the Federal Courts (Art. 3, Sec. 2, U. S. Const.) If Scott was not
a citizen of Missouri he had no right to institute his action in the
Federal Court and, therefore, it was without jurisdiction to entertain
it. The allegation on this point was that Scott was a negro of
African descent, his parents having been of pure African blood, and
brought to the United States as slaves. The question was thus stated
and answered by the Court:
"The question then arises, whether the provisions of the
Constitution, in relation to the personal rights and privileges to
which the citizen of a State should be entitled, embraced the
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negro African race, at that time in this country, or who might
afterwards be imported, who had then or should afterwards be
made free in any State; and to put it in the power of a single State
to make him a citizen of the United States?

*

*

*

*

"The Court thinks the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error could
not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning
of the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was
not entitled to sue in its Courts."
The court also decided that, assuming the principle to be true,
that if a slave was carried by his master into a state wherein slavery
was prohibited, the slave would be free under the laws of that state,
yet, if the slave returned with the master to a slave state, in an action
for his freedom his status was to be decided by the law of the latter
state: and therefore although Dred Scott had been carried by his
master into the State of Illinois where slavery was prohibited by the
Constitution, still, as he had returned with his master to Missouri
where slavery was permitted by law, his right to freedom was to be
determined by the law of Missouri, not by the law of Illinois.
The case might well have been rested upon this proposition,
and if this had been done there would have been little or no
excitement or comment about it because the question would then
have simply been the personal rights of the plaintiff, Dred Scott,
and would have involved no great political principles; and this
at one stage of the procedure had been determined upon, and
the case assigned to Mr. Justice Nelson to write the opinion,
resting it upon the fact that Dred had returned with his master
to Missouri after the visit to Illinois, and therefore, his right
to freedom must be determined by the law of Missouri. But
the court was persuaded to extend the scope of the opinion so as
to include the right of a negro to be made a citizen and also to
include the validity of the Missouri Compromise; and the Chief
Justice, writing for the court, held in the opinion that the Missouri
Compromise was invalid. In so doing, it was said that slaves
were property in no way different from other kinds of property;
and as the territories belonged to all the people of the United
States, each citizen had a right to take his property into the
territory without let or hindrance by the Congress of the United
States.
After setting forth the views of the court at great length and
the reasons upon which they were based, it was said:
"Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that
the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and
owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States
north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the
Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott
himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried
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into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the
owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident."
This opinion was received by the South with great joy as settling forever the question of the right of a citizen to carry his slaves
at will into any part of the territory of the United States. On the
contrary, it incurred the most severe condemnation in the North,
which recognized in it the fact that slavery was now crystallized by
law in all of the territories of the country; and that no public sentiment against it, no consideration of its immorality could stop its
onward march. Everywhere throughout the North, public speakers
denounced it in unmeasured terms as a purely political opinion, having
no sound basis in reason or morality, and promulgated purely for the
exigencies of a political party. Its soundness was one of the central
points of the great debate between Mr. Douglass and Mr. Lincoln in
their race for the United States Senate, and Lincoln criticised it without mercy. It was, however, believed by many that the people at
large would acquiesce in the findings of the court. A profound respect
for the opinion of the judiciary has ever been the attitude of the
Anglo-Saxon race. Indeed, this respect constitutes the keystone of
Anglo-Saxon civilization; and it was therefore not without reason
that many people believed that the opinion of the court in this case
would be accepted, and that the great question involved in it-the
right to extend slavery throughout the territories-was forever settled
adversely to freedom and in favor of slavery.
In the North, it was claimed that the court had gone beyond its
jurisaiction in passing upon the validity of the Missouri Compromise,
because having held that Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri and
not entitled to institute his action in a Federal court, the United States
Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction of the case and that any further
inquiry into the case was coram non judice. The Chief Justice was
mercilessly criticised for going beyond the question of jurisdiction in
order to hold invalid an act of Congress, which constituted the basis
of the settlement of a great moral question. In this, however, they
overlooked the fact that Chief Justice Marshall did the same thing
in the case of Marbury against Madison (i Cranch 137), and the

opinion in the lasi case has been praised as much as any other judicial
uttera-'ce of the great Chief Justice. It is also said that the court
was :mduly influenced by the pressure of pul,ii, sentiment, and in this
the critics may be right for, after all, judges are but men and subject
to the same kind of influences as other men.
As a rule, a judge does not control his political prejudices; but
these, lying as they do at the very foundation of his mental nature,
influence him, and it may be admitted that Chief Justice Tawny and his
associates were insensibly influenced by the political situation and
by the hopes and expectations of the statesmen and politicians with
whom they were surrounded. But if this be true, they were not in a
different attitude from that of Chief Justice Marshall and his associates in the great Dartmouth College case (IV Wheaton 518). When
that case was argued at the bar, it was well known that five of the
seven Justices were adverse to the College; and the court having
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adjourned for the summer without reaching a conclusion, there was a
deliberate conspiracy on the part of the friends of the college to
influence the court.
Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge in his life of Daniel Webster, who was
chief counsel for Dartmouth College, gives a most interesting account
of how the political side of that great case was managed. With great
glee he recites how Webster played upon the political passions of the
Chief Justice in order to obtain his sympathy. He states that Mr.
Webster was sure of the sympathy of the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Washington, and he was equally sure of the opposition of the
other five. After speaking at length on the subject of Mr. Webster's
management of the case, Mr. Lodge says:
"But this management now entered on a much higher stage,
where it was -destined to win victory, and exhibited in a high
degree tact and knowledge of men. Mr. Webster was fully aware
that he could rely, in any aspect of the case, upon the sympathy
of Marshall and Washington. He was equally certain of the
unyielding opposition of Duvall and Todd; the other three judges,
Johnson, Livingston and Story, were knewn to be adverse to the
college, but were possible converts. The first point was to
increase the sympathy of the Chief Justice to an eager and even
passionate support. Mr. Webster knew the chord to strike, and
he touched it with a master hand."
Speaking of the status of the case at the conclusion of the argument, the author says:
"The fact probably was that Marshall found the judges five
to two against the college, and that the task of bringing them
into line was not a light one. In this undertaking, however, he
was powerfully aided by the counsel and all the friends of the
college. The old board of trustees had already paid much attention to public opinion. The press was largely Federalist, and,
under the pressure of what was made a party question, they
had espoused warmly the cause of the college. Letters and
essays had appeared, and pamphlets had been circulated, together
with the arguments of the counsel at Exeter. This work was
pushed with increased eagerness after the argument at Washington, and the object now was to create about the three doubtful
judges an atmosphere of public opinion" which should imperceptibly bring them over to the college. Johnson, Livingston and
Story were all men who would have started at the barest suspicion
of outside influence even in the most legitimate form of argument,
which was all that was ever thought of or attempted. This made
the task of the trustees very delicate and difficult in developing
a public sentiment which should sway the judges without their
being aware of it. The printed arguments of"Mason, Smith and
Webster were carefully sent to certain of the judges, but not to
all. All documents of a similar character found their way to the
same quarters. The leading Federalists were aroused everywhere,
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so that the judges might be made to feel their opinion. With
Story, as a New England man, a Democrat by circumstances, a
Federalist by nature, there was but little difficulty. A thorough
review of the case, joined with Mr. Webster's argument, caused
him soon to change his first impression. To reach Livingston and
Johnson was not so easy, for they were out of New England, and
it was necessary to go a long way round to get at them. The
great legal upholder of Federalism in New York was Chancellor
Kent. His first impression, like that of Story, was decidedly
against the college, but after much effort on the part of the
trustees and their able allies, Kent was converted, partly through
his reason, partly through his Federalism, and then his powers
of persuasion and his great influence on opinion came to bear
very directly on Livingston, more remotely on Johnson. The
whole business was managed like a quiet, decorous political campaign."
So, if it be admitted, as said before, that political pressure was
brought to bear upon the court in the Dred Scott case, much more
so was that true of the opinion in the Dartmouth College case. for
which Chief Justice Marshall has been pr-ised by the legal world
ever since it was written, and if it be true, as said before, that Tawny
went beyond the question of jurisdiction and decided the merits of the
case without having jurisdiction, he had a precedent from Marshall
to follow in Marbury vs. Madison supra. Perhaps in no case ever
decided was there so much vilification of the court as in the one under
discussion. Among other things it was said, and has been reiterated
time and time again, that Chief Justice Tawny held that a black man
has no rights that a white man is bound to respect. Nothing is furthefrom the truth than this. The negro race had no more sincere
sympathizer than Chief Justice Tawny, who was an emancipationist
who freed all the negroes he inherited except the old ones who were
unable to care for themselves, and these he tenderly supported until
death; and what he said was not his own opinion about the question
of slavery but what he thought, the public opinion was at the time of
the Declaration of Independence. Here is the exact language used:
"It is difficult to realize at this day the state of public opinion
in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the
Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the
United States was framed and adopted. But the public history of
every European nation displays it in a manner too plain to be
mistaken.
"They had for more than a century before been regarded as
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with
the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit."
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But while the foregoing language does not support the political
myth as to what Chief Justice Tawny said about negroes not having
any rights that the white man was bound to respect, it does show
that he allowed his political feelings to express themselves at the
expense of the truth of history. The great part of the civilized world
did not at the time of the Declaration of Independence and the formation of the Constitution hold the views respecting slavery which the
Chief justice expressed in the opinion; but, on the contrary, a great
part of the people in the United States, at those times, both of the
North and the South, viewed slavery as both inexpedient and morallv
wrong.
In drafting the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson
used the severest language in regard to slavery in arraigning George
III for his sins against America. It is true that this language as
reported was stricken out by Conzress, but this was done only to please
Georgia and South Carolina. The representatives bf the great majority of the states agreed with Thomas Jefferson and the committee
on the subject; but, at any rate, these were the views of one of the
greatest statesman of the South. The language referred to is as
follows:
"He (George the Third) has waged cruel war against human
nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in
the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to
incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This
piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers, is the warfare
of a Christian king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open
market where men should be bought and sold, he has prostituted
his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit
or to restrain this execrable commerce. And that this assemblage
of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now
exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by'murdering
the people on whom he also obtruded them: thus paying former
crimes committed against the liberties of one people with crimes
which he urges them to commit against the lives of another."
While the Constitutional Convention was in session, the Congress
of the expiring Confederation inserted into the ordinance establishing
the Northwest Territory, Section 6, which in the most explicit terms
prohibits slavery in all that vast territory.
Surely it cannot be truthfully said in the light of these facts that.
at the time of the Declaration of Independence and the formation of
the Constitution, slavery was viewed by the civilized world as being
altogether right and expedient, and that negroes had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect.
We believe that the learned Chief Justice was swayed by his
political prejudices far beyond the true facts as to what the people
at large thought of slavery at the time of the promulgation of the
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Declaration of Independence and the formation of the Constitution.
But we also believe that no greater or purer court ever sat on the
woolsack than that which was constituted by Chief Justice Tawny
and his associate justices.
Chief Justice Tawny was a more learned lawyer than Chief Justice
Marshall, and he was altogether as upright and pure a magistrate
as was the great Virginian; and while we disagree with him in the
conclusion that he reached, we believe also that the opinion handed
down by the court was dictated by the purest sentiment of justice
under the law as the Court understood it.
Tawny and his associates in the Dred Scott case were carried
away by their political prejudices just as Marshall and his associates
were carried away in the Dartmouth College case. It took a great
war to undo the moral wrong of the principle enunciated in the Dred
Scott case, and every state in the Union has had to pass acts reserving
the right of repeal and alteration in charters granted to corporations
in order to escape the blighting effects of the principle enunciated in
the Dartmouth College case. The public at large has much misinformation with regard to the case under discussion. Dred Scott
is viewed as a poor, persecuted negro man, fighting for his own liberty
and that of his wife and children. The Chief Justice is thought of as
a pro-slavery Democrat of the narrowest type, with no sympathy for
the colored man and believing that he had no rights that the white
man was bound to respect. The legal master of Dred Scott is supposed
to have been a slave driver who had cruelly beaten his slave, and thus
forced him to go into the courts for that relief that he could not find
in the mercy of the master.
As a matter of fact, the Chief Justice, as 'said above was called an
Emancipationist because he lived in the South. If he had been a
northern man, he would have been called an Abolitionist. Dred
Scott's mistress, at the time this suit was instituted, was Mrs. Chaffee,
and her husband was an Abolitionist member of Congress from the
State of Massachusetts. The trustee, John F. A. Sanford, brother of
Mrs. Chaffee, was an Abolitionist, who resided in the State of New
York. Dred Scott was only a slave in name. In good truth, he had
been as free as the winds for years before the suit was brought. His
legal masters were anxiously desirous of finding a way to emancipate
him, but because they were non-residents, there was much diffculty
in doing so under the law of Missouri. He was living at free quarters
in the family of a former master, Mr. Taylor Blow, of St. Louis, and
after the suit was ended and his petition had been denied, his legal
masters conveyed him to Taylor Blow for the purpose of having him
set free, and this was done.
Dred Scott and his trustee master, John F. A. Sanford, both died
in 1858, just before the curtain of that great Civil War, which the
case did so much to hurry, was rolled up; and after this dreadful war
was over, slavery was dead, secession was dead, and the disunited
parts of our empire republic, north and south, had been welded by the
hammering and flames of war into a more perfect union "an indestructible Union composed of indestructible states."

